India’s power sector faces unprecedented transformation amid push for net zero and nuclear growth

India faces a profound restructuring of its power system over the coming decades as policymakers plan for a grid dominated by variable renewables while managing the persistent role of coal and the scaling challenges of firm low‑carbon resources.

According to a NITI Aayog study titled “Scenarios Towards Viksit Bharat and Net Zero”, continuation of current policies would see renewable generation rise from roughly one‑fifth of output in 2024–25 to more than four‑fifths by 2070, with coal’s share falling to the mid single digits. Under a faster “Net Zero” pathway aligned with India’s 2070 emissions goal, the study projects coal‑fired generation could be phased out entirely. The same analysis anticipates a major expansion of nuclear capacity , from about 8 GW today to between 90–135 GW by 2070 under the modest pathway and up to 295–320 GW under the accelerated scenario , positioning nuclear as a provider of dependable, low‑carbon baseload and industrial heat for applications such as electrolytic hydrogen production.

The transition will require investment on an unprecedented scale. Industry reporting of NITI Aayog findings places cumulative power‑sector capital needs in the tens of trillions of dollars by 2070, with different estimates ranging from roughly $14.2 trillion for the power sector alone to broader net‑zero price tags above $22 trillion for the entire economy, of which electricity accounts for over half. These figures underline the magnitude of financing, grid and industrial planning required to electrify demand and decarbonise end uses.

Yet large differences persist between capacity build‑out and energy actually produced. Despite installed renewables tripling over the past decade to about 258 GW by December 2025, renewables supplied only around 22% of electricity in 2024–25. NITI Aayog attributes the shortfall to structural characteristics of solar and wind , lower capacity utilisation, intermittency, curtailment, transmission bottlenecks and limited operational flexibility , which together constrain their contribution to reliable, 24×7 supply. State‑run distribution companies’ fragile finances, land acquisition hurdles and lines‑of‑sight for new transmission infrastructure further slow deployment, as noted in reporting by the Associated Press.

Balancing a renewables‑heavy system will depend critically on storage and flexible low‑carbon firming resources. The NITI analysis projects battery energy storage to grow from negligible levels today to roughly 1,300–1,400 GW by 2070 under the current policy path, and as high as 2,500–3,000 GW under the net‑zero pathway. Pumped hydro also features as long‑duration infrastructure, expanding to around 110 GW–165 GW by mid‑century. These numbers imply a colossal industrial build‑out of manufacturing, supply chains and grid integration capabilities for long‑duration storage technologies that remain costly and commercially nascent at scale.

Given those gaps, the report sets out alternative trajectories. One envisages a sizeable retained coal fleet in 2070 with deep decarbonisation achieved by widespread deployment of carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) on thermal plants , a route that becomes salient if renewable, storage or nuclear expansion falters because of cost, land or regulatory bottlenecks. Another pathway assumes constrained nuclear growth and therefore requires an even larger solar rollout , potentially exceeding 5,500 GW , together with vastly more storage to sustain grid reliability.

Policy choices are already tilting towards greater nuclear engagement. Government plans announced in the 2025 budget, reported by Le Monde, include a mission to reach 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047, legal changes to attract private and foreign capital, and exploration of small modular reactors (SMRs) and international partnerships. NITI Aayog recommends accelerating nuclear to 100 GW by India’s centenary of independence in 2047 and to 200–300 GW by 2070, and proposes incentives for large industrial and captive power users to repower coal‑fired captive plants with SMRs to preserve existing land, transmission links and industrial infrastructure while lowering emissions.

For industrial decarbonisation strategists, the implications are immediate. A renewables‑dominant system will alter supply‑side risk profiles, electricity price dynamics and the availability of firm low‑carbon power for energy‑intensive sectors. Firms planning electrification or green hydrogen projects will need to factor in the timing, location and reliability of clean baseload and long‑duration storage, together with potential capacity‑market mechanisms and offtake structures to underwrite investment in nuclear and CCUS. The scale of projected investment highlights the need for coordinated policy frameworks to mobilise public and private capital, streamline land and grid permits, shore up distribution finances and develop local manufacturing for batteries, SMRs and CCUS components.

Ultimately, the NITI scenarios present multiple credible futures rather than a single forecast. The pace at which long‑duration storage, nuclear deployments and CCUS scale , and the effectiveness of reforms to transmission, market design and distribution finances , will determine whether India’s grid completes the shift away from coal smoothly, or whether substantial coal capacity persists in a low‑utilisation reserve role supported by mitigation technologies. For industrial players, the prudent course is to design flexibility into decarbonisation plans so they remain robust across these divergent pathways.