Offshore wind’s 2026 paradox: record activity amid political and economic uncertainties

The offshore wind industry enters 2026 in a paradoxical state: beset by a weaker investment case and political headwinds, yet physically busier than at any recent moment. Data from Clarksons Research shows 53 GW of offshore wind capacity currently under construction or post-final investment decision, and an unusually large pipeline of projects due to reach start-up over the next two years. According to Clarksons, an average of 19 GW of capacity and about US$62 billion of capex will come online each year over the next two years, compared with roughly 9 GW and US$24 billion per annum over the previous four years.

That construction wave reflects earlier commitments and FIDs rather than fresh enthusiasm: industry observers emphasise the difference between activity driven by sunk capex and an uncertain forward development pipeline. The Global Wind Energy Council reported that 2024 was a record year for construction and auctions, adding 8 GW and bringing total installed offshore capacity to about 83 GW, but warned that macroeconomic headwinds and supply chain constraints have downgraded the short-term outlook.

Europe remains the strategic centrepiece for offshore wind policy. The North Sea Summit in Hamburg in January 2026 is expected to test political will: ministers will be pressed for concrete measures to revive project economics, accelerate cross-border grid builds and recommit to clear volumes that give the supply chain confidence. According to the European Commission’s North Seas Energy Cooperation, regional cooperation on offshore electricity and hydrogen grids is central to the EU’s REPowerEU objectives and the wider European Green Deal. The Esbjerg Declaration and bilateral initiatives such as the strengthened 2025 partnership between Germany and Denmark underline political intent to integrate offshore wind with interconnectors and hydrogen infrastructure, but translating commitments into bankable revenue models remains the challenge.

Industry voices, and some governments, argue that auction design must change. A shift from “negative bidding” models to Contracts for Difference or similarly stable offtake mechanisms is widely urged to restore the business case and unlock supply‑chain investment. As one recent industry commentary put it, a “New Deal” for offshore wind in which governments commit to clear volumes and credible revenue support would enable suppliers to pledge cost reductions, jobs and industrial investment.

Outside Europe, progress is uneven and in many cases stalled. Policymakers in emerging markets are deferring auctions or seeking additional EU or multilateral financial support before committing to floating or deepwater projects. Portugal’s minister for the environment and energy has said offshore development will proceed only when it is economically viable; reporting suggests Lisbon will pursue floating auctions only with significant financial assistance. Australia’s early-2030s expectations have been tempered by developer exits, with AGL abandoning its Gippsland Skies project in Victoria in December 2025, underscoring the difficulty of developing complex projects where ports, vessels and local heavy‑lift capabilities are immature. Colombia’s 2025 lease award to Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners shows new markets can advance, but the single-bid outcome illustrates the fragility of progress where financing and local participation remain limited.

Floating wind faces its own postponements. With fixed-bottom projects already under strain, the more costly floating segment is likely to see limited new deployments in 2026. Industry analysis from TGS and others has slashed near-term floating forecasts, citing difficulties in securing offtake contracts, permitting and financing that push meaningful scale beyond 2030. Early commercial-scale floating projects, ScotWind parcels, Utsira Nord in Norway and France’s AO5/AO6, will be crucibles for ports, moorings, heavy-lift logistics and financing structures. As ABL group growth director John MacAskill recently warned, “Failures here will be very expensive, and successes will set patterns for the 2030s.”

Supply‑chain decisions made this year will shape the sector for decades. Proposals for fully integrated turbine manufacturing, most notably Ming Yang Smart Energy’s plan for Britain’s largest such facility, are under intense scrutiny. The company says the plant would create jobs and speed up deployment; UK government departments, security agencies and investor groups have held extensive discussions. According to reporting, the UK Ministry of Defence has raised security concerns, while political voices in the United States have urged caution on Chinese investment. The UK government’s decision in 2026 , to approve or refuse Ming Yang’s plan , will carry industrial, geopolitical and energy transition implications, and could influence whether Europe prioritises domestic turbine supply chains or accepts overseas manufacturing partnerships.

The immediate policy imperative is clear: convert political pledges into predictable revenue frameworks and coordinated infrastructure plans. North Sea cooperation mechanisms, bilateral energy partnerships and renewed auction models offer pathways, but industry players say they need volume certainty and less policy churn to commit to the industrial investments that will deliver cost reductions. For industrial decarbonisation professionals, the coming 12 months will therefore be defined less by the cranes and foundations already at sea and more by whether policymakers deliver the contractual certainty and cross-border grid architecture needed to convert today’s construction wave into a sustained, resilient offshore sector through the 2030s.