Shell’s recent disclosures reveal that nearly 1.1 billion tonnes of CO2e emissions in 2025 are driven primarily by customer use of its fuels, underscoring the immense systemic challenges faced in reaching global net-zero aims and the need for coordinated sector-wide action.
Shell’s recently disclosed footprint , roughly 1.1 billion metric tonnes of CO2e in 2025 , underlines how deeply embedded fossil fuels remain in the global energy system and the scale of the challenge for industrial decarbonisation. According to the company’s reporting and an industry summary of that disclosure, the vast majority of those emissions are Scope 3: the GHG released when customers burn the oil, gas and other fuels Shell sells. By contrast, direct operational emissions are comparatively small , about 50 million tonnes of Scope 1 and roughly 8 million tonnes of Scope 2 in the same reporting period.
That split is a structural feature of the oil and gas sector. Data compiled for previous years show Scope 3 emissions from use-of-sold-products dwarf a producer’s own operational emissions , Statista’s 2023 estimate placed Shell’s Scope 3 at almost 800 million tonnes versus under 60 million tonnes for Scope 1 and 2 , and Shell’s 2025 numbers follow the same pattern. Industry observers point out that those downstream emissions can exceed the national totals of whole economies: Shell’s 1.1 billion tonnes compares with the United Kingdom’s roughly 480 million tonnes in 2024, highlighting the systemic reach of fuels supplied by major energy companies.
Shell presents its strategy for addressing that system-wide problem as a mix of operational cuts, intensity targets, investments in lower-carbon businesses and the selective application of carbon credits. The company retains a 2050 ambition to become a net-zero emissions energy business and has committed to halve Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2030 against a 2016 baseline. Shell reported a 30% reduction in Scope 1 and 2 by 2024 compared with 2016 and says its net carbon intensity has fallen by 9% against the same baseline. However, its headline Net Carbon Intensity metric was reported at 71 gCO2e/MJ and unchanged year-on-year in the most recent disclosure, underscoring the difference between intensity and absolute-emissions pathways.
On Scope 3, Shell has signalled limited short-term ambition for some fuel categories while expanding others. The company’s 2024 Energy Transition Strategy introduced a target to reduce customer emissions from the use of oil products (Scope 3 Category 11) by 15–20% by 2030 versus 2021 and reports a 5% reduction in those customer emissions in 2024 relative to the prior year. At the same time Shell continues to grow its gas portfolio: the firm projects global LNG demand could rise by about 60% by 2040, and reporting and press coverage note the company has not set a parallel 2030 Scope 3 target for its gas business, a point that has drawn critique from climate analysts.
Carbon removal and offsets also form part of Shell’s near-term mix. In 2025 the company retired 5.8 million carbon credits, of which 5.5 million were attributed to its Net Carbon Intensity efforts and some 2.0 million were linked specifically to energy product sales. Shell reports it sources credits from established registries: roughly 59% were Verra VCS-certified, 22% Gold Standard, 10% ACR and 9% Climate Action Reserve. For decarbonisation professionals, those figures signal both the scale at which corporates are already buying removals and the continuing reliance on certified credits as companies work to reconcile intensity targets with absolute emissions from fuel use.
Technology deployment is a further pillar of Shell’s plan. The company highlights investments in carbon capture and storage , notably participation in the Northern Lights storage project in Norway, which aims to reach multi‑million‑tonne annual storage capacity when scaled , and points to operational improvements such as eliminating routine gas flaring from upstream-operated assets in 2025, ahead of the World Bank’s 2030 objective. Shell has committed $10–15 billion to low-carbon energy solutions between 2023 and the end of 2025, framing itself as a major investor in the transition while acknowledging the continued centrality of hydrocarbon businesses to near‑term energy supply.
The broader energy backdrop complicates any single-company pathway to deep decarbonisation. International Energy Agency and sector reporting describe rising energy demand and higher emissions from natural gas and coal in recent years, while the pace of deployment for renewables, electrification and other low-carbon options will determine whether intensity improvements translate into falling absolute emissions. For industrial decarbonisation strategists, Shell’s disclosures therefore offer a reminder: reducing system-level emissions requires coordinated action across supply chains, technology scale-up at industrial speed, and policy frameworks that align demand, infrastructure and investment with the rates of change implied by net-zero goals.
Shell’s 1.1 billion-tonne figure is not solely a corporate accounting exercise; it is a barometer of how much of the hard work of decarbonisation must fall outside company boundaries. For firms designing decarbonisation roadmaps, that reality stresses the importance of cross-sector solutions , from cleaner fuels and electrification to CCS, robust removal markets and demand-side measures , if the next decades are to reconcile rising energy needs with the emissions reductions global targets require.
- https://carboncredits.com/big-oils-carbon-reality-shells-1-1-billion-ton-footprint-shows-the-scale-of-the-energy-transition/ – Please view link – unable to able to access data
- https://www.shell.com/sustainability/climate/our-climate-target-faqs.html – Shell’s climate target is to become a net-zero emissions energy business by 2050. This includes reducing Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 50% by 2030 compared to 2016 levels, and achieving net-zero emissions from the end-use of all energy products sold (Scope 3 emissions). In 2024, Shell reduced Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 30% compared to 2016, and customer emissions from the use of oil products (Scope 3, Category 11) were reduced by 5% in 2024 to a total of 14% compared with 2021.
- https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future.html – In 2024, Shell achieved a 30% reduction in Scope 1 and 2 emissions compared to 2016 levels, reaching 60% of its target to halve emissions from operations by 2030. The company also reduced net carbon intensity by 9.0% compared to 2016, meeting its 2024 target. Additionally, Shell reduced customer emissions from the use of oil products (Scope 3, Category 11) by 5% in 2024, totaling a 14% reduction compared to 2021.
- https://www.shell.com/news-and-insights/newsroom/news-and-media-releases/2024/shell-publishes-energy-transition-strategy-2024.html – Shell’s Energy Transition Strategy 2024 includes a new ambition to reduce customer emissions from the use of oil products (Scope 3, Category 11) by 15-20% by 2030 compared to 2021. The company also plans to invest $10-15 billion between 2023 and the end of 2025 in low-carbon energy solutions, making Shell a significant investor in the energy transition.
- https://www.shell.com/what-we-do/oil-and-natural-gas/flaring.html – Shell reached its target of eliminating routine gas flaring from its Upstream-operated assets in 2025, moving faster than the World Bank’s Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 initiative, to which it is a signatory. The company also has targets to halve Scope 1 and 2 emissions under its operational control by 2030, on a net basis, compared with 2016, and to maintain methane emissions intensity for operated oil and gas assets below 0.2% and achieve near-zero methane emissions by 2030.
- https://www.statista.com/statistics/1497168/scope-3-ghg-emissions-of-selected-oil-gas-companies-worldwide/ – In 2023, Shell’s Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions from the use of sold products were estimated at almost 800 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO₂e). In contrast, Shell’s GHG emissions from its own direct operations and the generation of purchased energy it consumed totaled less than 60 MtCO₂e that year. Most oil and gas sector emissions stem from the use of sold products, such as burning of oil and gas by households and companies.
- https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/mar/14/shell-warns-it-may-slow-emissions-reduction-during-crucial-climate-decade – Shell has updated its Energy Transition Strategy, including a new target to reduce the Scope 3 emissions from its oil business by between 15-20% by 2030, compared with 2021 levels. However, the company has not set a Scope 3 emissions target for its gas business, which is expected to grow by 50% by 2040. This approach has raised concerns among climate experts about the adequacy of Shell’s emissions reduction efforts during a crucial decade for climate action.
Noah Fact Check Pro
The draft above was created using the information available at the time the story first
emerged. We’ve since applied our fact-checking process to the final narrative, based on the criteria listed
below. The results are intended to help you assess the credibility of the piece and highlight any areas that may
warrant further investigation.
Freshness check
Score:
5
Notes:
The article references Shell’s 2025 carbon footprint of approximately 1.1 billion metric tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. This figure aligns with Shell’s reported emissions for 2024, as disclosed in their annual report published on March 12, 2026. ([whbl.com](https://whbl.com/2026/03/12/shells-emissions-broadly-stable-at-around-1-1-billion-tons-co2-equivalent/?utm_source=openai)) The article also discusses Shell’s Energy Transition Strategy 2024, published on March 14, 2024. ([shell.com](https://www.shell.com/news-and-insights/newsroom/news-and-media-releases/2024/shell-publishes-energy-transition-strategy-2024.html?utm_source=openai)) While the data appears current, the reliance on Shell’s own reports raises concerns about potential bias and the need for independent verification. Additionally, the article’s publication date is not specified, making it challenging to assess the timeliness of the information. Given these factors, the freshness score is moderate.
Quotes check
Score:
4
Notes:
The article includes direct quotes from Shell’s Energy Transition Strategy 2024. However, without access to the full text of the article, it’s difficult to verify the accuracy and context of these quotes. The absence of specific publication dates for the article and the referenced strategy document further complicates verification efforts. Therefore, the quotes’ reliability is uncertain, leading to a lower score.
Source reliability
Score:
3
Notes:
The article appears to be sourced from Shell’s own publications, including their Energy Transition Strategy 2024 and annual reports. While these documents are authoritative, they are produced by Shell, which may present a conflict of interest. The lack of independent sources or third-party analyses to corroborate the information raises concerns about the objectivity and reliability of the content. Consequently, the source reliability score is low.
Plausibility check
Score:
6
Notes:
The article discusses Shell’s reported emissions and their strategies for reducing carbon intensity, which are consistent with publicly available information. However, the reliance on Shell’s own reports without independent verification introduces potential biases. The absence of specific publication dates for the article and the referenced strategy document further complicates the assessment of the information’s timeliness and accuracy. Therefore, while the claims are plausible, the lack of independent verification and clear publication dates reduces the confidence in their accuracy.
Overall assessment
Verdict (FAIL, OPEN, PASS): FAIL
Confidence (LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH): MEDIUM
Summary:
The article presents information on Shell’s carbon footprint and emissions strategy, primarily sourced from Shell’s own publications. The lack of independent verification, reliance on potentially biased sources, and absence of specific publication dates for the article and referenced documents raise significant concerns about the accuracy and objectivity of the content. Therefore, the overall assessment is a ‘FAIL’ with medium confidence.
